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ABSTRACT 
Beginning in 1789 and escalating in intensity into at least 1793, a new temporal 
schema took shape in which revolutionary time pulverized the foundations of 
the old order. Revolution came to mean rejecting the past, introducing a sense 
of rupture in secular time, maximizing and elongating the present in order to 
turn it into a moment of personal and collective transformation, and shaping the 
future in accordance with the discoveries made in the present. Time ceased 
being a given. It became a medium of endless potential for change that could be 
willed, that is, enacted by conscious choice.	
In the opening lines of his report to the National Convention on the 
new republican calendar, P.F.N. Fabre d’Eglantine explained the 
logic of the revolutionary reform of time: «The regeneration of the 
French people, the establishment of the republic, have necessarily led 
to the reform of the common era [l’ère vulgaire]. We can no longer 
count the years in which kings oppressed us as a time in which we 
have lived». A new calendar, he argued, would produce a new 
people: «it is therefore necessary to replace these visions of ignorance 
with the realities of reason and priestly prestige with the truth of 
nature»1. 
The «realities of reason» and «truth of nature» required a rational 
calendar divided into twelve equal months of 30 days each. The 	
1 P.F.N. Fabre d’Églantine, Rapport fait à la Convention nationale dans la séance du 3 
du second mois de la seconde année de la République française, au nom de la Commission 
chargée de la confection du calendrier par P.F.N. Fabre-d’Eglantine, Imprimé par ordre de 
la Convention, Paris 1793, pp. 1-2. 






months were named after a seasonal element: Germinal, for instance, 
connoted germination of seeds, while Floréal stood for the month of 
flowering. Each month had three ten-day divisions called décades («a 
common numerical name») and days called primidi, duodi, etc. up to 
décadi in order to eliminate any trace of extraneous imagery2. At the 
end came five days (six in leap years) of ‘sans-culottides’ devoted to 
uplifting festivals.  
The calendar was doomed for many reasons. It reset time at the 
foundation of the French republic ensuring that it would never be 
used outside of French-controlled territories or be embraced by 
opponents of the republic within France. Because it began in the 
third week of September, the months did not coincide with 
Gregorian calendar months, making any translation between the two 
calendars all the more difficult. The abolition of Sunday as a day of 
rest and of religious observance once every seven days in favor of 
décadi every ten guaranteed resistance in the working classes and 
among the Catholic devout. Despite all these obstacles, the 
republican calendar regulated official communication for more than 
a decade3.  
Although the reform of the calendar failed to take root in the way 
that the metric system eventually did, the experiment with the 
calendar captures in the most dramatic fashion the revolutionary 
obsession with time. This preoccupation took many forms ranging 
from the most general to the very specific. It was fueled by the 
conviction that revolutionaries could institute a rupture with the past 
and in the process recast the political consciousness of the citizenry. 
The desire for rupture first drew on and then propelled forward a 
startling rejection of many past practices from the determination of 
the Third Estate’s deputies to the Estates General not to meet 	
2 Ibidem, pp. 9-10. 
3 M. Shaw, Time and the French Revolution: The Republican Calendar, 1789-Year XIV, 
The Royal Historical Society and The Boydell Press, Rochester (NY) 2011; S. 
Bianchi, La bataille du calendrier ou le décadi contre le dimanche. Nouvelles approches pour 
la réception du calendrier républicain en milieu rural, «Annales historiques de la 
Révolution française», 312, 1998, pp. 245-264; S. Perovic, The Calendar in Revolu-
tionary France: Perceptions of Time in Literature, Culture, Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2012. 
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separately from the other two estates in May-June 1789 to the tearing 
down of royal statues in 1792, the renaming of streets and squares 
and even cities, the introduction of new secular names for children 
(Brutus, Tell, Tricolore, etc.), and the preference for the use of 
citoyen[ne] rather than Monsieur or Madame in common speech4.    
To truly break with the past, regeneration had to be achieved as 
quickly as possible. The calendar was meant to be a public statement 
of an already accomplished rift. As Gilbert Romme, its main 
architect explained, this was «one of the most important operations» 
undertaken toward «the progress of the arts and the human spirit», 
an undertaking that could only succeed «in a time of revolution» [un 
temps de révolution]. By its very existence, the calendar effaced 
eighteen centuries of fanaticism; now «time opens a new book of 
history» that will capture «the annals of regenerated France»5.  
 Romme was not alone in speaking of ‘revolutionary time’ as 
something very different from what had come before. From the very 
beginning of the French Revolution, in July 1789, commentators 
searched for ways of expressing their sense of the compression and 
therefore acceleration of time. The newspaper Révolutions  de Paris 
referred in its second issue to «the innumerable multiplicity of 
events these last eight days […] a thousand  pens would not suffice 
to trace  all the details». That third week in July 1789 seemed «a 
week that was for us six centuries»6. Every unexpected turn of 
events had the same effect. After the king’s attempted escape in 
June 1791, Jeanne-Marie Roland wrote, «we are living through 
ten years in twenty-four hours; events and emotions are jumbled 
together and follow each other with a singular rapidity»7. 	
4  L. Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, University of 
California Press, Berkeley 1984, pp. 52-86; S. Bianchi, Les ‘prénoms révolutionnaires’ 
dans la révolution française : un chantier en devenir, «Annales historiques de la 
Révolution française», 322, 2000, pp. 17-38.  
5  G. Romme, Rapport sur l’ère de la République: séance du 10 septembre 1793, 
Imprimé par ordre de la Convention Nationale, Paris 1793, pp. 1-2. 
6 Révolutions de Paris, Dédiées à la Nation, vol. 2 (Du samedi 18 au 25 juillet 
1789): pp. 1 and 7. 
7 C. Perroud (éd.), Lettres de Madame Roland, vol. 2: 1788-1793, Imprimerie 





Within weeks of the fall of the Bastille, it became customary to 
identify this quickening of time with revolution. The fact that 
Louis-Marie Prudhomme named his paper Révolutions de Paris 
from its first appearance on 18 July 1789 gives some hint of this. 
On the evening of 6 October 1789, Jacques-Pierre Brissot dashed off 
his first account of the ‘October Days’ (5-6 October 1789) for his 
newspaper Le patriote  françois: «The events that have taken place right 
in front of us appear almost like a dream [...]. We cannot give a 
detailed  account today of this astonishing Revolution»8.  
Contemporaries clearly sensed that something momentous was 
happening from July 1789 onward, but the significance of 
revolutionary time did not congeal all at once. After all, calendar 
reform was not proposed until the fall of 1793. Keith Baker argues 
that a change in the meaning of revolution occurred sometime in the 
second half of 1789, probably around the October Days. When 
Prudhomme first published his paper in July, revolution still meant 
an unexpected and dramatic event. But as one event became a 
succession of them, participants and observers, such as the journalists 
associated with Révolutions de Paris, began to detect a distinctive 
rhythm, a special revolutionary dynamic, and the emergence of an 
entirely new epoch that was separating itself from the ‘ancien 
régime’9.   
The term ancien régime changed in tandem with revolution. It had 
been used infrequently before 1789 to refer to former regimes, such 
as the Gauls before Clovis or the way an abbey was run before it was 
combined with another10. Starting in the spring of 1789, during the 
quarrels over voting by head, pamphleteers who opposed voting by 
order used it to refer to the previous dominance of the privileged 
orders: «Suivant l’ancien régime, la noblesse & le clergé, qui ne sont 
	
8 «Le patriote f rançois», No. 63, Mercredi 7 octobre 1789, p. 3. 
9 K.M. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the 
Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, p. 221.  
10 Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence civile, criminelle, canonique et bénéficiale, 
vol. 13, Chez Panckoucke, Paris 1777, p. 302; and vol. 48, Chez Panckoucke et 
Dupuis, Paris 1781, p. 13.  
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pas ensemble que la trentième partie de la nation, ont chacun 
séparément une force égale à tout le reste des citoyens»11.  
Before long, though it is difficult to say exactly when, the ancien 
régime became the former regime, that which had been superseded. 
In a 1789 tract on the rights and obligations of a ‘free people’ (a 
phrase that in itself signified that a transformation had occurred), the 
author urged his fellow citizens to vote carefully because «L’Égoïsme, 
qui sous l’ancien régime pouvait tout, et menait à tout, causerait 
aujourd’hui la destruction générale»12. By 1790, at the latest, Jean-
Paul Marat regularly fulminated against those, such as Necker, whom 
he suspected of trying to maintain or restore the ancien régime: 
«Aujourd’hui même il sollicite l’assemblée de lui accorder de grands, 
de prompts secours, sous prétexte d’empêcher la dissolution de l’état, 
de régénérer les finances, mais uniquement pour affermir l’admini-
stration, pour le mettre en état de perpétuer l’ancien régime»13.  
Thus bit by bit, beginning in 1789 and escalating in intensity into at 
least 1793 if not 1794, a new temporal schema took shape in which 
revolutionary time pulverized the foundations of the old order. In a 
rather innocuous pamphlet from January 1790 on the subject of 
scarcity of cash in Paris, the author clearly distinguished «un temps 
de révolution» as one of crisis and uncertainty while people were 
waiting for «a new political system» in which «former abuses would 
be reformed»14. Revolutionary time occupied the gap between old 
and new; a time of revolution served as a hothouse in which the 
remaining weeds from the past could be dug up while the shoots of 
the new took root. A pamphlet on military recruitment published in 
1789 opined that «il faut éprouver quelque temps la révolution que 	
11 Motion faite par un citoyen dans l’assemblée du district de Saint-Germain-des-Prés, le 21 
avril 1789 : suppression de tous privilèges pour les élections, NP 1789, pp. 5-6. 
12 F.-A.-E. de Gourcy, Les droits et devoirs d’un peuple libre ou Le triomphe de la liberté 
française, Chez Dupain, Paris 1789, p. 48.  
13 J.-P. Marat, Dénonciation contre Necker, in Ch. Vellay (éd.), Les pamphlets – 1790, 
Libr. Charpentier et Fasquelle, Paris 1911, p. 92. 
14 Motion faite au district des Recollets, le 14 janvier 1790, sur la situation allarmante de 
la capital, relativement à la rareté extrême du numéraire, De l’imprimerie de P. Fr. Didot 





fera la Constitution dans les esprits; elle doit avoir une grande 
influence sur l’agriculture, le commerce et l’esprit militaire»15.    
For those living in 1789 and the years following, revolution came to 
mean rejecting the past, introducing a sense of rupture in secular 
time, maximizing and elongating the present in order to turn it into a 
moment of personal and collective transformation, and shaping the 
future in accordance with the discoveries made in the present. Time 
ceased being a given. It became a medium of endless potential for 
change that could be willed, that is, enacted by conscious choice. 
This new relationship to time was arguably the most significant 
innovation of the French Revolution. It established both 
revolutionary time (and therefore revolution as a future choice) and 
modern time (the sense that modernity represented a break with 
tradition). Revolutionary time and modern time are not the same 
thing, yet the French Revolution played a crucial role in setting both 
into motion. As a result, it has occupied an important place in recent 
considerations of the operation of historical time16.    
Modernity, the idea that modern time is distinctive, has roots that 
reach further into the past than 1789, but the French Revolution 
helped shape its meaning in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, modernity is, among other 
possible definitions in English, «An intellectual tendency or social 
perspective characterized by departure from or repudiation of 
traditional ideas, doctrines, and cultural values in favour of 
contemporary or radical values and beliefs (chiefly those of scientific 
rationalism and liberalism)»17. The French Revolution made it seem 
possible to consciously depart from the past and even repudiate it 
altogether precisely because it was contrary to the principles of 	
15 Second rapport du comité militaire, par M. Dubois de Crancé, secrétaire de l’Assemblée 
Nationale, sur l’établissement des milices nationales et le recrutement de l’armée, Chez 
Badouin, Paris 1789, p. 17.  
16 It comes up repeatedly, for example, in the work of R. Koselleck, Futures 
Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, Engl. transl. by K. Tribe, Columbia 
University Press, New York 1985. 
17 <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/120626?redirectedFrom=modernity#eid> 
(Consulted 13 November 2012). 
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reason and national sovereignty, in other words, ‘scientific 
rationalism and liberalism’. 
Partisans of modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth century did 
not necessarily consider themselves followers of the French Revolu-
tion or adherents of revolution more generally. Yet they subscribed, 
whether consciously or not, to elements of the temporal schema put 
into place by the French Revolution. In that schema, those in the 
present would constantly endeavor to create something new, modern, 
up-to-date and future-oriented. The past would no longer serve as a 
reservoir of exemplars for present behavior; the past would be what 
had to be overcome in order to make a better future.     
Revolutionary time and modern time intersected in various ways. 
The most momentous of those intersections was the significance 
attributed to the very passage of time. Abbé Sieyès already sensed 
this development in early 1789. In his pamphlet, Qu-est ce que le tiers 
état? he presciently established the connection between revolution, 
time, and the hidden dynamic of events: «On fermerait en vain les 
yeux sur la révolution que le temps et la force des choses ont opérée; 
elle n’en est pas moins réelle. Autrefois, le tiers était serf, l’ordre 
noble était tout. Aujourd’hui le tiers est tout, la noblesse est un 
mot»18. Fate, the pressure of circumstances, ‘la force des choses’ now 
clearly had a dynamic of its own that was revealed by time’s passing.   
As events cascaded after July 1789 those who lived through them 
felt there must be hidden meanings that had escaped their notice. For 
many, even among the educated classes, that meaning was provided 
by conspiracies. What else but intrigue and collusion could explain 
the constant jolting of expectations? From the fall of the Bastille 
onward fear of conspiracy was in the air. Jean-Paul Marat was far 
from alone in denouncing ‘l’horrible complot’ or ‘l’affreuse 
conjuration’. Only the march of time could reveal the truth by 
eventually tearing off the veil of criminal plotters19. Revolutionary 
	
18 E.J. Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?, éd. par E. Champion, Au siège de la 
Société [de l’Histoire de la Révolution Française], Paris 1888, p. 79. 
19 L. Hunt, The World We Have Gained: The Future of the French Revolution, «The 





time was locked in mortal combat with what Robespierre called in 
1790 «les temps d’intrigues et de factions»20.  
Despite this conviction that events were being secretly controlled by 
plotters who were acting in full consciousness of their aims, the 
understanding of time’s passage as revelatory of an inner significance 
also opened the way to a new kind of determinism. Bertrand Barère, 
leading member of the Comité de Salut Public, and thus one of the 
architects of the Terror, retrospectively excused his actions as the 
product of his time: «I did not at all shape my epoch, time of revo-
lution and political storms  [ . . . ] ; I only did what I had to do, 
obey it. It [l’époque] sovereignly commanded so many peoples and 
kings, so many geniuses, so many talents, wills and even events that 
this submission to the era and this obedience to the spirit of the 
century cannot be imputed to crime or fault»21.   
This view of time’s deterministic quality opened the way to social 
explanations and ultimately to social science as a systematic study of 
the force of circumstances. It is perhaps not surprising that Sieyès 
was the first to use the term social science [«science sociale»] and that 
it occurred in that same pamphlet on the Third Estate. The circle 
around Condorcet began using the term in 1791, Condorcet 
himself took it up in 1792, and his disciples played a key role in 
establishing various clubs, societies and finally a section of the new 
Institut national (1795) devoted to ‘science sociale et législation’22.  
Foremost among these disciples was Antoine Louis Claude Destutt 
de Tracy, who played a central role in giving the term currency. In 
his Mémoire sur la faculté de penser of 1798, for example, Destutt de 
Tracy explicitly linked science sociale to the deterministic side of 
time: «on peut dire que la science sociale méritera à peine le nom de 
science, tant qu’elle n’aura pas des principes reconnus et systématisés, 	
20 M. de Robespierre, Réponse de M. de Robespierre ... à une lettre de M. Lambert, 
contrôleur général des finances, De l’imp. de L. Potier de Lille, Paris 1790, p. 5.  
21 S. Luzzatto, Un futur au passé: La Révolution dans les Mémoires des Conven-
tionnels, «Annales historiques de l a  Révolution française», 278, 1989, pp. 455-
475, quote 469. 
22 R. Wokler, Saint-Simon and the Passage from Political to Social Science, in A.R. 
Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1990, pp. 325-338.  
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à l’aide desquels nous puissions expliquer et même prédire le 
bonheur et le malheur des diverses sociétés, et ne les voir que comme 
des conséquences nécessaires et constantes de lois démontrées»23. 
The goal of the new social science was to explain and even predict 
the future of societies by getting at the laws that determined their 
development. Destutt de Tracy influenced, as much as anyone, the 
subsequent emergence of sociology in France from Benjamin 
Constant to Auguste Comte and beyond24.      
Determinism was the other side of the coin of voluntarism – the 
idea that humans could shape their future. Determinism, especially 
insofar as it gave rise to social science, was the explanation for why 
humans had fallen short of controlling their future. Deputy Henri 
Grégoire, who was often one of the first to grasp the significance of 
unfolding events, put his finger on the voluntaristic aspect of 
revolutionary time: «Le peuple français a dépassé les autres peuples; 
cependant le régime detestable dont nous secouons les lambeaux 
nous tient encore à grande distance de la nature; il reste un intervalle 
énorme entre ce que nous sommes et ce que nous pourrions être. 
Hâtons-nous de combler cet intervalle; reconstituons la nature 
humaine en lui donnant une nouvelle trempe». Not surprisingly, 
Grégoire said this as part of a discussion of elementary education25. 
The Terror itself sprouted from the effort to ‘fill this interval’, ‘to 
reconstitute human nature’, or in other words, to accelerate the 
effects of time. 
Ironically, even though revolutionary time was meant to erase what 
Grégoire termed ‘le régime detestable’ of the past, the study of the 
past, history, gained a new significance. Peter Fritzsche argues that 	
23 Mémoire sur la faculté de penser [1798], ARTFL Electronic Edition, 2009, p. 26, 
<http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgibin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.1356:2:6:0:29
.frantext0513.172648.172656>. 
24  M.S. Staum, Minerva’s Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution, McGill-
Queen’s University Press, Montreal 1996.  
25 Rapport sur l’ouverture d’un concours pour les livres élémentaires de la première éducation, 
par Grégoire (Séance du 3 pluviôse an II), in M.J. Guillaume (éd.), Procès-verbaux du 
Comité d’instruction publique de la Convention nationale, vol. 3, Imprimerie nationale, 
Paris 1897, p. 365. The sense of a ‘mythic present’ of regeneration is discussed 





history writing gained a larger role around 1800 because the new 
emphasis on disconnection from the past – the past no longer served 
as a guide to the future – led to a kind of cultural melancholy26. The 
past turned opaque and thus required more serious scholarship. At 
the same time history began to appeal to more and more people; the 
French Revolution brought the people on to the stage of politics, and 
historians therefore had to pay attention to them in their writing. The 
genres of historical writing proliferated, with the historical novel 
being one of the striking examples. The writing of history was thus 
profoundly influenced by the French Revolution’s reframing of time.  
It is here, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, that modern 
time takes over from revolutionary time even while incorporating 
some of its most fundamental assumptions and paradoxes. Without 
the French Revolution, Hegel would not have seized upon the idea of 
codifying the meaning of time’s passage, much less finding in history 
a secular teleology of the consciousness of freedom and the 
progressive realization of reason27. The French Revolution played an 
even more central role in Marx’s thinking about history because it 
enabled him to make revolution the central hinge in the historical 
development of class struggles. Both Hegel and Marx seized upon the 
notion that the passage of time itself could be analyzed for its inner 
significance. They therefore helped cement the complicity between 
modernity and history writing suggested by Fritzsche and before him 
by Reinhart Koselleck. By reconfiguring the past, the very positing of 
modernity opened up a new role for history. 
Koselleck’s account of this development has been deeply influ-
ential and is still being developed in present day considerations of 
time, history, and modernity. Over the course of the early modern 
period [frühen Neuzeit], Koselleck argues, history was ‘temporalized’ as 
it became ‘singular’ and superior to preceding times. It becomes 
singular in the sense that it ceased being a repository of repeatable 	
26 P. Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2004.  
27 Hegel was also deeply influenced by the Enlightenment and by the need to 
incorporate and surpass it in his philosophical system. L.P. Hinchman, Hegel’s 
Critique of the Enlightenment, University of Florida Press, Gainesville (FL) 1984. 
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exempla and became instead a nonreplicable progression. At the end 
of this process «there is the peculiar form of acceleration which 
characterizes modernity». Koselleck traces the experience of 
acceleration to the French Revolution, for its leaders unconsciously 
secularized the eschatological expectations of Christians28.   
Koselleck focuses on the period 1750-1850 as the period in which 
the philosophy of history and the disciplinary practice of history both 
emerged; they were connected by a new notion of time, not by 
individuals who practiced both forms. In his view the Enlightenment 
as much as the French Revolution (he refers to «the second half of 
the eighteenth century») created neue Zeit or modernity. «Time is no 
longer simply the medium in which all histories take place», he 
maintains, «it gains a historical quality». As a consequence, «history 
no longer occurs in, but through time. Time becomes a dynamic and 
historical force in its own right»29.  
When Koselleck traces the emergence of this new conception and 
experience of time, he looks for it in historical and philosophical 
writings for the most part. The French Revolution comes up again 
and again but rarely alone or with much specificity. Thus, for 
example, when speaking of the transformation of time from a 
religious apocalyptic framework to a secular one of historical hope, 
he says, «This subjective anticipation of a future both desired and to 
be quickened acquired an unexpectedly solid reality, however, 
through the process of technicalization and the French Revolution». 
Technology plays an apparently equal role. Similarly, when speaking 
of the use of the history of revolutions by different political ideologies, 
he references Kant, Mazzini, Marx and Proudhon even while rec-
ognizing the influence of the revolution of 1789: «In 1789 a new 
space of expectation was constituted whose perspective was traced 
out by points which, at the same time, referred back to different 
phases of the past revolution». As a result, «According to party or 
position, the categories of acceleration and retardation (evident since 	
28 Koselleck, Futures Past, pp. 5, 47. 
29 Ibidem, p. 246. See also the excellent review by J. Zammito, Koselleck’s 
Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History, «History and Theory», 43, 





the French Revolution) alter the relations of past and future in 
varying rhythms»30.  
For Koselleck, then, the French Revolution is pivotal, though not 
just on its own. This is no doubt fundamentally correct, for new 
conceptions and experiences of time must have intellectual roots and 
intellectual consequences as well as political, cultural, and even 
social, economic, technological and demographic ones31. The brief 
history recounted in this essay is not offered as a critique of 
Koselleck; his reflections on historical time have deeply influenced 
my own. The account given here aims to get at how the French 
Revolution altered the conception of time so that time gained ‘an 
historical quality’, that is so that time became revelatory of some 
inner essence. The closer look at the evidence presented here shows 
that this change in the conception of time did not happen all at once 
but rather took shape in bits and pieces in the years after 1789. 
Although historical antecedents for this transformation of time can 
be traced back to the middle of the eighteenth century, there can be 
no denying that 1789 shocked the system so much that it set in 
motion a change that would most likely have been unimaginable 
otherwise. No one at the time understood the process as it was 
occurring and few grasped it even in the decades or generations 
afterward. Koselleck, after all, did not publish his thoughts on the 
subject until well into the twentieth century. We are only just 
beginning to get a handle on the epochal transformation that took 
place at the end of the eighteenth century. It may well be that the 
current interest in past conceptions of time grows out of our own 
sense that our current ones need rethinking too.  
Since French revolutionaries of the 1790s only dimly glimpsed the 
process in which they found themselves engaged, explaining why, as 
opposed to how, the French Revolution altered the conception of 
time must remain somewhat speculative. The focus on time in the 
French Revolution seems to follow from the experience of revolution 	
30 Ibidem, p. 37. 
31 W.M. Nelson, The Weapon of Time: Constructing the Future in France, 1750-Year I, 
Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 2006. Id., Making Men: Enlightenment Ideas of Racial 
Engineering, «American Historical Review», 115, 2010, no. 5, pp. 1364-1394. 
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as a period of acceleration. Acceleration in turn was fueled by the 
sense that the French were reliving, at least implicitly, the primordial 
moment of social contract. They were beginning anew and had to 
rush to fill that interval described by Grégoire between what they 
were and what they could be. They had to accelerate time.  
Although Jean-Jacques Rousseau bequeathed many notions about 
the social contract to the revolutionaries, he said almost nothing 
about the actual experience of it. For him, the social contract was a 
mostly hypothetical notion, being a convention that had few real time 
points of reference. His only historical examples were Sparta, Rome 
after the Tarquins, and Holland and Switzerland in modern times. 
Rousseau did describe these as moments of regeneration: «L’état, 
embrasé par les guerres civiles, renaît pour ainsi dire de sa cendre et 
reprend la vigueur de la jeunesse en sortant des bras de la mort. Telle 
fut Sparte au temps de Lycurgue, telle fut Rome après les tarquins, et 
telles ont été parmi nous la Hollande et la Suisse après l’expulsion des 
tyrans»32. Yet Rousseau clearly saw this as renewal and recovery 
rather than as a leap into the future, and he focused on the meaning 
for the state rather than for individuals. 
For the revolutionaries, in contrast, the moment of forging the 
social contract was something they came to know firsthand. Émile 
Durkheim captured the essence of the experience nearly a century 
later, no doubt because the French Revolution occupied a pivotal 
position in his own thinking about society and the sacred: 
There are periods in history when, under the influence of some great 
collective shock, social interactions have become much more frequent and 
active. Men look for each other and assemble together more than ever. 
That general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutionary 
or creative epochs. Now this greater activity results in a general 
stimulation of individual forces. Men see more and differently now than in 
normal times. Changes are not merely of shades and degrees; men become 
different. The passions moving them are of such an intensity that they 
	
32 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, éd. par B. De Jouvenel, C. Bourquin, 





cannot be satisfied except by violent and unrestrained actions, actions of 
superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism33. 
Durkheim goes on to compare this to religious experience; this 
effervescence is what he calls the fundamental form of religious life, 
which becomes in the modern era the basis of social life itself. The 
French Revolution, then, is the moment when people discover the 
social roots of their being, when sacredness, in Durkheim’s terms, is 
transferred from religion to society. 
This transfer of sacredness has been analyzed most convincingly by 
Mona Ozouf. Revolutionary festivals, funeral processions, relocations 
of remains to the Pantheon of revolutionary heroes, and inaugura-
tions of busts all contributed to this transfer of the sacred. The 
swearing of oaths occupied such a central place in the festivals, she 
argues, because «it rendered visible the act of contracting, conceived 
as the fundamental characteristic of sociability»34. Thus the moment 
of swearing an oath constituted the literal enactment of the social 
contract; it was the moment at which the sacred was transferred to 
society, to the social bond. The oath was one of the ways by which 
society could be rendered sacred. 
The imagined return to the origins of social and political life was 
repeatedly reenacted in France: in the heady days of challenging the 
ancien régime in 1789, in the Festival of Federation of 1790, in the 
drafting of a first written constitution for the sovereign nation, and in 
the decision to depose and then execute the king and establish a 
republic. In fact, it was not so much a question of certain decisive 
political acts as much as it was a constant re-stimulation, or at least 
attempted re-stimulation since the feeling was far from unanimous, of 
that ‘general effervescence’ that constituted the direct experience of 
the social bond.  
This ceaseless re-enacting of the social contract – repeated over 
time and across the space of France – gave democracy both an 	
33 É. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Engl. transl. by J. 
Ward Swain, Macmillan, New York 1915 (original French version: 1912), p. 
241. 
34 M. Ozouf, La fête révolutionnaire, 1789-1799, Gallimard, Paris 1976, p. 337. 
The title of her concluding chapter is La fête révolutionnaire: un transfert de sacralité.  
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immediate and an unstable foundation. The oaths, for example, 
signaled a willingness to begin anew from that very instant, yet 
precisely because this re-enactment of the social contract relied on an 
instantaneous feeling of adherence, it was susceptible to an equally 
abrupt rejection or at least reluctance to join in a new social bond 
whose parameters would remain shifting and uncertain. Still, 
thousands, perhaps millions, of people – and not just French people –
now felt that the scales were falling from their eyes. They spoke 
repeatedly of having been blinded by the habits of despotic authority; 
they were awakening to a new day, a new time. As one newspaper 
wrote about the execution of the king, the French had discovered 
«that great truth which the prejudices of so many centuries had 
stifled; today we have just convinced ourselves that a king is only a 
man»35. 
The attempt to reset time failed in the 1790s in the sense that both 
the revolutionary calendar and the republic with which it was 
associated failed to endure. At the same time the new conceptions of 
temporality that emerged from that quest succeeded in unimaginable 
ways. Revolutionary time and modern time have shaped the lives of 
people all over the world for more than two centuries. It may be time 
now to re-evaluate them and perhaps even move on to another 
understanding of time’s influence, another ‘regime of historicity’36. 
Yet there is no denying that the French Revolution set in motion 
dynamics that structure our experience of politics and social life to 
this day. Understanding those dynamics still presents a challenge that 
endures and an enigma that demands our attention.      
  
	
35 «Journal des hommes libres de tous les pays», No. 82,  22 January 
1793. 
36 F. Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: présentisme et expériences du temps, Seuil, Paris 
2003. On the differences between Hartog and Koselleck, see G. Lenclud, 
Traversées dans le temps, «Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales», 61, 2006, pp. 
1053-1084. 
